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Abstract: In this work we will talk about implicit memory, a function of 
mind  which  contains  and  represents  the  first  traces  of  environmental 
interaction  and  which  follows  us  for  all  our  life.  We  will  talk  about 
discoveries  in  neuroscientific  field  which  contribute  clarifying  change’s 
places and mechanisms.  In proposing a satisfying explanation of implicit 
memory,  and  moreover  its  emotional  implications,  we  will  address  the 
possible  existing  interconnections  between  neuroscienses,  starting  from 
neuronal plasticity constructs and networks, and subjectual group analysis, 
explicating  the  mind-body-relation  paradigm,  with  the  purpose  of 
integrating particular opinions to enrich a common vision.   
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1.INTRODUCTION 
The matter of relation between mind and brain has always been central in 
the study of subjective aspects related to psychic activity. During the time 
on  this  subject  numerous  theories  have  been  elaborated,  some  of  which 
recur in current discussions. 
In the last decades in fact, neuroscienses, that is the whole of subjects which 
have as specific object of study the nervous system, have created a net of 
connections between philosophical, psychological and biomedical sciences 
such  to  virtually  configure  itself  as  a  network    continuously  in  process 
capable of integrating data learned from various ambits of research and of 
opening to continuous  connections and new possibilities of theories about 
study of mind. All this in the perspective of an integration of the knowledge 
one time coexisted as dualisms and today offers us a new perspective on the 
forming of human experience, insofar they are capable to confer scientific 
rigor to intuitions and hopes on the idea of care, or better on the idea of how 
relation and its quality can heal. 
From the wide and complex field of neuroscientific discoveries we chose, 
for the correlation with subjectual analysis, to cross the path of memory, in 
particular, we will have as object of observation the implicit memory, the 
precious  function  which  keeps  the  traces  of  our  story  and  so  of  our 
individual and collective being. 
 
 
 
 
Implicit memory    
 
Trying to make a synthesis of what implicit memory represents, in its sense 
of Self organizer, we could outline a series of focal points which would 
show how this cognitive function is extremely precious: 
 
  It represents the first kind of registration of experience 
  It is the only possible memory at birth and during the first 24 months of 
life, as it comes about in brain’s subcortical structures which are already 
mature at that stage of development 
  It is activated with environmental sensorial experience and doesn’t go 
along with awareness of remembering MJCP, IMPLICIT MEMORY    3 
  It  is  still  emotional  or  affective  memory,    in  the  sense  that  it  is 
determined and determines the emotional quality of experience 
  It is a mind function which walks along with us for all our life and it is 
plastic, capable of transformations. 
 
Squire (1992), Schacter (1995) and LeDoux (1969) researches has shown us 
the  qualities  and  places  of  implicit  memory,  in  particular  amygdala,  the 
emotional center of our brain. Differently from superior cortical areas which 
illuminate in zones, amygdala is all, constantly, illuminated, with a major or 
minor intensity according to the major or minor emotional intensity of the 
experience. Impulses come from senses in a few milliseconds, a very short 
time  for  word,  unlikely  for  a  drug’s  action,  sufficient  for  non  verbal 
messages such as a look or the tone of a voice, the rhythm of a movement or 
a  scent  in  the  air.  We  are  in  the  reign  of  pre-verbal  and  pre-symbolic, 
certainly of the non conscious. 
It is in this space, in fact, that brain builds its mental patterns, that is the 
basic components of implicit memory. These patterns, result of the relation 
with  the  outside,  help  to  found  familiar  objects  and  experiences,  and  to 
understand what we must expect from the environment around us. 
But  which  are  the  neurobiological  modifications  able  to  explain  the 
mechanism of stimulating of an emotional memory? 
Any  sound  or  image  that  can  set  off  an  emotional  reaction,  without  the 
subject being conscious about it, is transferred to the implicit memory. This 
reaction  implies  neurofisiological  modifications,  such  as  variation  in  the 
heart beat or breathing rhythm, paleness, blush, sweating. These states are 
registered in the thalamus which is connected to amygdala in turn connected 
to  Hypothalamus  and  so  with  endocrine  and  autonomic  regulation. 
Therefore a certain event will be saved with its emotional coloring, taking a 
subjective value. The memory is stored, so that it can be evocated in whole 
by any detail but belonging to the memorized scene; for example a caress or 
a scent can take us to remember a pasted event of our life. 
Generally events that are strongly characterized of an emotional valence are 
remembered with high sharpness, and this is possible because of the positive 
connection between the value of memory’s vividness and the value of the 
emotional strength of the event in the moment it has happened (Oliverio, 
2013).  4  LAMPASONA R., LO VERSO G. ET AL. 
This allows a variety of clinical reflections, one among many, for example, 
could  be  the  possibility  to  use  implicit  memory  as  a  rehabilitation 
instrument for treatment of patients with dementia.  
Actually, in front of the various losses of mnemic traces in patients with 
neurodegenerative  diseases  it  could  turn  out  to  be  effective  stimulating 
memories, starting from the value and the emotional impact that they cover 
in  the  patient’s  life;  they  would  represent,  therefore,  the  main  road  or 
probably  one  of  the  few  communicative  strategies  that  is  possible  to 
experience with these subjects, especially in an advanced stage of disease, 
when  the  language  as  the  other  cognitive  capabilities  are  severely 
compromised. 
Actual researches on using massages with persons affected by dementia, 
have put in evidence the existence of only 18 studies on massage therapy 
and  dementia  and  only  2  of  which  were  considered  suitable  in  their 
methodological rigour. The few amount of data available at the moment is 
in favour of massage and touch for want concernes the therapeutic efficacy 
in demential subjects with behavioral troubles, but the same data are too 
limited to allow general conclusions (Hansen, Jorgensen, Ortenblad, 2006). 
The hypothesis of improving the condition of life of these patients through 
the awakening of emotions and non verbal contacts, essentially made of 
looks, caresses, scents, sounds, seems to be a kind of action which deserves 
to be more deepened .  
 
 
 
 
Implicit memory in therapeutic relation 
 
Siegel says that in the forming of a mind the social element comes before 
the individual one. In the model that holds up his study neurological and 
psychological knowledge are kept together:  both neuron and dialog, both 
brain maps and the socializing function of smile and preverbal caresses. The 
mind,  says  in  fact  Siegel,  “is  the  product  of  interactions  between 
interpersonal experiences and brain’s structures and fuctions”. 
The  characteristics  of  implicit  memory  which  we  have  explored 
immediately open connections with the basic assumptions of clinical work, 
in particular they give centrality to relational experience. 
If the first memory traces of interaction tend to form the early pattern of 
orientation, and if these traces are plastic, that is transformable, we know MJCP, IMPLICIT MEMORY    5 
that the traces can be reached and transformed in the same way they were 
formed, that is with our being in the world, our way of being (Barnà, 2007). 
Therefore, implicit memory can change. In the implicit memory there are 
the earlier relational patterns, the unconscious representations that we bring 
in our relations. Here is the root of the transfert
  which alters our daily 
therapeutic and non therapeutic meetings (Allen, 2003). 
Let’s take for example a passage of Daniel Siegel’s text “The relational 
mind” : «A thirty years old woman sits quiet at the therapist’s. When he 
asks her for the second time “How did the visit to your mother go, the last 
week end?”, she seems confused, she bites her lips, looks away and stare at 
the floor without saying anything. Then she covers her eyes with her arm 
and starts moving nervously her feet, while her breathing becomes quicker 
and quicker. Silence. At this point, the therapist realizes that his heart beat is 
accelerating, looks at the floor and notices that he is rhythmically tapping 
his feet against the floor too. His state of mind is showing with non verbal 
signs: the expression of his face, looks, movements. In a low voice, slowly 
says “I understand, it was a difficult week end” and in the meanwhile he 
feels  his  head  is  going  to  blow  up.  Suddenly  the  patient  exclaims 
“Horrible!” The therapist immediately feels a sense of relief, his muscles 
relax, pressure in his head disappears. The woman seems less tense too: 
“Horrible” repeats moaning and starts crying. […] Communicate does not 
only mean to understand or feel the signs - verbal and non verbal - that are 
passed  by  others;  because  between  two  individuals  begins  an  full  and 
effective emotional communication it is necessary that each of the involved 
person let his state of mind be influenced by the state of mind of the other.» 
Therefore, in a therapeutic meeting many states of mind are activated; the 
contents and the ways of the talk, the rhythm and the cadence of the session, 
the safety created by the set(ting), the time, the room, they all activate all the 
levels  of  memory.  They  are  elements  that  “arrive”  to  the  explicit  and 
conscious memory, but they arrive to the implicit memory too, maybe not 
immediately, it takes some kind of check (the therapist that smiles or has a 
benevolent look, the same room, that the time is not changed too often, that 
the therapist is honest in his honorarium) with all the other thousand of 
information that have to do with his “being there” for us (Weiss, 1993). 
The states of consciousness that can be generated within the set(ting)are 
shared by both patient ad therapist: we can say today, more that yesterday, 
that relation cures.
   
In  fact  we  can  say  that  changes  in  the  State  of  Ego  consist  in  altering 
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depends on the nature of the affection implicated in relational processes (…) 
(Scilligo, 2005). 
This consideration send us back to the work “La cura relazionale” (Lo Coco 
e  Lo  Verso,  2006),  which  proposes  a  reading  of  psychic  pain  as  a 
“relational” phenomenon, not exclusively attributable to the functioning of 
the  single  person  but  as  event  which  becomes  significant  in  the  net  of 
relations in which the person is included. Such a reading of psychic pain 
implies  by  consequence  the  elaboration  of  methods  an  patterns  of  care 
which provides the numerous relation between persons as a an instrument of 
transformation/change. The task of who treats, who treats, is so to think 
about and put up therapeutic projects able to keep together the person’s 
significant relational nets.     
It is basic to consider these concepts in an interpersonal dimension as it is 
exactly  the interiorizing of the therapeutic relation and co-construction of 
new meaning which lead to change and cure.   
As Liotti (2005) affirms, “if the therapist interacts with the patient so that a 
unconscious  expectation  of  a  repetition  of  the  negative  experience  is 
disconfirmed, then will happen important improvements in the therapeutic 
relation”. 
The Noble premium Eric. R. Kandel in his work affirms: “If changes led by 
psychotherapy  keep  in  time,  it  would  be  reasonable  to  infer  that 
psychotherapy leads to different structural modification in the brain, like it 
happens in other kinds of learning. 
 
 
 
The relation that cures: confronting theoretical prospects 
To face the “relational” matter , it is necessary to take a step backwards and 
shortly run through the more incisive and innovative discoveries, coming 
from  neuroscienses  and  from  clinical  dynamic  psychology,  which  are  of 
merit  of  connecting  the  neuronal  development  with  the  experience 
interweaved  of  human  relations  through  which  each  person  can  realize 
evolutionarily himself. 
The neurosciences, now by a long time, have proposed a plastic conception 
of brain, which follows that orientation known to the scientific world as 
neural Darwinism (Edelman, 1995, 2004, 2007). Specifically, it considers 
the  brain  as  a  plastic  and  opened  to  experiences  organ,  able  to  assume 
different  structural  and  functional  features  connotations,  according  to 
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This constant plasticity is in various ways related to the radical relational 
essence of the mental which constantly builds structural matchings with the 
environment system (Napolitani, 1987), that is new combinations between 
things in the world, which generate an incessant psychic dynamism.    
The man's identity is characterized from the outset for its 'culturalism', ie to 
the settlement, tanto più stabile tanto più precoce, of  segments relational the 
environments which relate the individual who born in that environment and 
you  go  expressing;  the  individual  identity  consists  of  relationships 
internalized  (identification) which together constitute a groupality internal 
(Napolitani, 1987) 
In a neuronal prospection the corresponding to the relational human essence 
are  mirror-neuron  (Iacoboni,  2008),  a  specific  type  of  neuron  which  is 
activated  either  when  someone  makes  a  determined  action  either  when 
observes others making it. The recent discovery of mirror neurons gives us 
an explanation of the neurobiological mechanisms involved in empathy and 
in recognizing and sharing mental states of others and of their emotional 
resonance, showing how reciprocity that ties us to others is a natural human 
condition,  pre-linguistic,  pre  conceptual  and  pre  rational  (Rizzolati  & 
Sinigaglia, 2006).  
Another  field  of  absolute  vanguard  is  the  one  that  explores  relations 
between  epigenetics,  behavior  and  mental  health:  particular  emotional 
contexts, the lack of parental care, determine in the new born alterations in 
the  methylation  processes  in  hippocampus  andin  the  hypothalamus-
hypophisis axis modifying its genetic expression and attachment style. 
LeDoux  (2002,  2006)  maintains  that  experiences  leave  their  sign  in  the 
brain  through  our  memory  register,  which  is  a  product  of  the  syna-ptic 
activity present and operating in neuronal circuit. 
In simple terms we can think that our organism is programmed to survive, 
reassuring idea if we think about the level of exposition to danger of which 
a creature becomes part at birth and in the first months of life. This creature 
“scannerizes”  the  environment,  in  neuroscientific  terms  “processes” 
sensorial stimulus that come from the outside, to verify the existence of a 
security condition and only after this operation activates other neural nets 
fixed  to  enjoy  them  same  sensorial  stimulus  he  has  verified  are  not 
dangerous. This is, first life, then its quality. 
In  this  logic,  a  child  who  has  the  luck  to  grow  in  a  secure  enough 
environment, will however tend to process sensorial stimulus before getting 
pleasure from them, but he won’t go looking for danger; parallelly, a less 
lucky child will almost certainly expect to find danger. 8  LAMPASONA R., LO VERSO G. ET AL. 
We are at the neurobiological basis of the attachment style; we are in the 
forming of relational schemes, to the roots of existential positions, at the 
primary protocol of the script. 
The concept of tuning (Stern, 1987), in a particular way, allows to start and 
explain how it is possible that in a child’s mind develops the capacity to 
integrate,  in  a  coherent  way,  the  different  instances  –  emotions,  desires, 
memories, perceptions, fears – that huddle together in the same moment. 
Through  the  processes  of  emotional  and  of  “ranging”  of  states  of  mind 
(Trevarten,  1998)  communication,  the  child  answers  to  parents’  neural 
activation patterns  through the mechanism of “Interiorizing”, which allows 
the activity of adult’s more mature brain to directly mould the development 
of his neuronal systems. The processes of emotional tuning create between 
parent’s and child’s mind connections which are essential in allowing the 
child’s brain to acquire the capacity to modulate and organize its functions 
in a more and more autonomous way. 
The adult supplies the child with schemes of organization of behavior which 
he will after interiorize and use inside his mind. In this sense, individual 
mind  is,  actually,  an  individualized  social  mind  (Siegel,  1999).  This 
elaboration  creates  direct  connections  with  subjectual  group  analytic 
research (Lo Verso, Di Blasi, 2011). 
In the new born seem in fact to exist some primitive and direct kind of 
affective  sharing,  which  consist  in  automatic  reactions  to  expressive 
stimulus showed in the other person.      
The  first  to  have  identified  the  existence  of  innate  abilities  of  emotion 
recognition, combined with an innate tendency to automatically respond to 
these  in  a  congruent  manner,  was  Charles  Darwin  (1872),  holding  that 
emotional expressions act as signals that communicate to those congeners a 
certain emotional state and are able to determine its expressive response for 
automatic  imitation.  Shooting  from  the  modern  ethologic,  Darwinian 
positions have been treated in terms of emotional contagion, defined as the 
set  of  immediate  and  involuntary  emotional  experiences  that  lead  us  to 
respond to emotional expressions directly for automatic imitation. 
According to Bonino, Lo Coco and Tani (1998), the tendency to answer 
immediately to others’ emotions, seems to be the dominant characteristic of 
the  affective  processes  in  child’s  first  months  of  life,  based  in  fact  on 
mechanisms of emotional tuning between mother and child which lead to a 
mutual affective mimicry. 
Wallon  (1967)in  this  sense  has  talks  about  automatic  and  precognitive 
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the  emotional  contagion  is  such  an  automatic  experience  of  emotional 
sharing  that the other’s emotions become the own emotions, and who is 
infected,  or  who  infects,  lives  the  same  emotions  without  difference 
between one’s experience from the other’s. 
Talking about emotional contagion in terms of imitation of a behavior, has 
lead Trevarthen (1993) to individuate in the new born the capacity to decode 
the other’s internal emotional states, catching directly his emotions, and to 
answer  to  them  in  an  equally  immediate  and  direct    way.  In  this  sense 
Trevarthen maintains the existence of an inborn, primary intersubjectivity, 
which allows to enter in a direct way to the others’ mental state: the child 
that observes the mother’s emotional expression, immediately imitates what 
perceived, tuning intersubjectively with her emotional experience.     
For  what  we  know  today,  tuning  is  the  matrix  of  each  therapeutic 
relationship. Today we know what they are the basics neurobiological, when 
we talk about intersubjectivity we speak the "alignment" of states minds 
(Trevarthen,  1993).  A  phenomenon  so  fascinating  precisely  because 
biological. The interaction between a child and the first attachment figure 
occurs through continuous phenomena of "alignment" of states of minds.  
Everything  is  fairly  summarized  in  the  vision  of  a  relationship  that 
nourishes,  cure  or  destroys,  and  also  affects  the  body  level,  because  the 
psychic life, as well as the biological life, relational processes arise from 
essentially psychosomatic. 
Siegel, as previously discussed, uses the results of neurobiological research 
to show how the interactions with the environment and in particular how the 
relationships  with  others,  have  a  direct  influence  on  the  development  of 
structures  and  biological  functions.  The  aim  of  his  work  is,  after  all, 
scientific  research  integrated  of  those  that  are  bases  interpersonal  and 
neurobiological, of the development of mind. 
Within this perspective, it seems appropriate to speak of a true theory of 
mind  in  fact  defined  as  the  ability  of  explanation  and  psychological 
understanding  possessed  by  humans,  which  allows  them  to  intuitively 
understand the emotions, actions and mental states of others through simple 
mental inferences. 
 
 
Relational minds and mental life of groups. 
The  vision  of  the  relational  mind  proposed  by  Siegel,  meets  with  the 
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theoric heart of the subjectual groupanalytic model (Lo Coco, Lo Verso, 
2006; Lo Verso, 1989, 1994). 
From a strictly neurobiological point of view, we made use of the theory of 
cerebral  function  to  explain  the  original  inter-subjectivity  of  the  human 
mind, which is what the groupanalysis subjectual has called Transpersonal. 
It is understood by Lo Verso (2008) as the set of relationships within a 
specific cultural device that the individual "incorporates", even dynamically, 
starting from birth, it is constitutive, on the side anthropo-psychic, from the 
psychic birth and then of personality. This processing is in favor of a non-
reductionist epistemology and circular that allows you to not be shortsighted 
about the strong presence in the body of the mind and the relationship. It is 
possible  to  support  with  more  rigorous  epistemic  interdisciplinary  the 
centrality of the relational dimension, which is the scenario in which real 
and imaginary emotional life unfolds (Lo Coco, Lo Verso, 2006). 
For the subjectual groupanalysis the concept of relation not only describes 
the  interactions  visible,  social  of  the  humans,  but  includes  the  invisible 
components of the unconscious psychic world of individuals and psychic 
fields existing relational among people and in the inner world of each (Lo 
Verso, 1994; Lo Verso, Di Blasi, 2011; Giorgi, Lo Verso, 2011). 
In light of the said, it should talk about the mind-body-relation, because 
without relationship is not given neither mental nor physical development 
(Lo Verso, 1994; Giannone, Lo Verso, 1996; Di Blasi, Lo Verso, 2006). 
The  Clinical  experience  and  psychotherapeutic,  the  contributions  of  the 
complexity theory (Morin and Pasqualini, 2006) and of the constructivist 
model, the evolution of neuroscience and clinical psychology (for example 
the infant observation, attachment theories, studies on the born of the family 
and  transmission  of  the  transpersonal  psychic)  with  the  heuristic 
possibilities that have opened, there have therefore led to propose a model 
mind-body that not homologous or not separates the three aspects of the 
problem  mind-body-report,  but  rather  sees  them  as  three  vertices  of 
observation, each of which may, and sometimes must, be privileged with a 
conscious "as if" with respect to pose a summit before another (Giorgi, Lo 
Verso, 2011).  
The importance attached in this work to the group context stems from the 
fact that in to subjectual groupanalisys, also from the methodological point 
of view, the very analysis focuses on the relationship Subject-Otherness-
Body, so that the group is presented as a observatory privileged to capture 
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In this regard, studies on the relational process in the field of experiential of 
the  psychotherapeutic situation (Lo Verso, 1989) show that every psychic 
event  is  realistically  experienced  in  the  body  and  vice  versa,  even  more 
radically this seems be able to extend to every relational fact (Lo Verso, Lo 
Coco, 2006). 
As already pointed out several times, under the thrust environmental, that is 
of experiences, is continually builds the brain: perceptual maps of the world 
would be subject to a continual recategorization, thanks to the action of 
memory and other functions. The psychic plasticity, meaning the ability of 
transformation during growth and development, is particularly evident in the 
group. The road to becoming ourselves splits into a large number of paths: if 
the connections established by our brain make us who we are the group can 
activate other connections, useful for the development and growth of our 
psychological self, social not only synaptic (Di Bella, 2006). 
The  set(ting)  groupanalytic,  own  because  fraught  with  looks,  bodies  and 
relationships,  seems  to  be  a  privileged  place  to  grasp  the  great  unifying 
value  of  Otherness.  It  is  within  this  therapeutic  device  that  circulate 
phenomena such as empathy, attunement, intersubjectivity, that result in the 
need to read the intentions and feelings of others and the need to define, 
maintain or restore the one's sense of identity and cohesion. The group as a  
bearer and conservative than implicit memory namely the ability to trigger 
the emotional component that originated from the mind, expressed by the 
body, is manifests in the report and this is a process vital that mobilizes 
continuously the behavior of the subject. 
In  the  group  you  do  not  look  outside,  but  inside  a  multiple  mirror  that 
creates a space in which the internal and the outer, the individual and the 
group interpenetrate and you overthrow one in the other; is in the other 
individuals in the group that an subject sees himself, and is in the other 
individuals which is found to reconstruct his image refracted. 
In summary, the mind is formed in the interaction between neurobiological 
processes and interpersonal relationships: are the relationships with others 
that favor or inhibit the organization of neural circuits, their ability to take 
action in response to stimuli that determine the way in which for lifelong we 
come into contact with the world and with ourselves, property that is the 
basis of implicit memory, in a epistemological framework that encompasses 
together, as if they were a single explanation of the phenomenon same, a 
point of view more properly organic, the relational mind, with a prospective 
more clinical-dynamic, the mental life of the group (Rugi, 1996). 
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CONCLUSION 
 
In summary we can say that an increasingly important part of neuroscience 
believes that the brain is a plastic organ and open to experience, able to take 
on different meanings structural and functional, depending on the genetic 
and experiential bases that characterize the individual. This conception of 
plasticity (and to some extent also dynamic and experiential) of the brain is 
of  central  importance  for  us  because  it  creates  possible  alignments  and 
compatibility with the results of the clinical-psychological research. 
The mind in substance should not be understood in terms of structure, but as 
a  dynamic  process  that  emerges  from  the  activity  of  the  brain,  whose 
functions  are  directly  influenced  by  interpersonal  experiences  (Siegel, 
1999). In particular, the mind is develops from processes that regulate flows 
of energy and information within the brain and between different brains 
(Siegel, 1999). The concept of the mind as an entity, therefore, needs to be 
reviewed. The mind is not a thing or an object located in the body or in 
space but a rope used to circumscribe many psychological processes, mental 
phenomena and personal experiences different, although often connected. 
Therefore, the contribution of neuroscience enriches the perspective on the 
formation of human experience, on the neurobiological basis of attachment 
style, on the origin of relational schemas, knowledge which are of a high 
explanatory power the psychotherapeutic dynamic and they give centrality 
of relational experience. 
Moreover, the groupanalysis has placed at the center of his observation the 
subject or rather the interplay of relational phenomena, understood as living 
presences,  inside  and  outside  the  subject  and  his  familiar  world.  In  this 
perspective,  the  groupanalysis  is  to  be  understood  not  only  as  practice 
analytic applied to groups but also as a new epistemological perspective that 
studies the mind in the sense multipersonal and not just individual. A theory 
of mind conceived how to plot of pre-concepts conscious and unconscious, 
beliefs  affective-emotional  and  schemes  behavioral  that  the  individual 
internalizes  in  the  relational  bathrooms  of  all  his  experiences  groupal: 
transgenerational  and  family,  social  and  cultural.  There  is  an  obvious 
reference to the concept of matrix, the network internalized and interactive 
relationships through which individuals create deep links and permanent. 
This network, as well as states Foulkes (1964), "is the matrix of mental life." 
The identity, in that sense, is structured and evolves in relational networks 
to which the subject belongs. So, to speak of Transpersonal mean to refer to MJCP, IMPLICIT MEMORY    13 
the network of relations unconscious in which it is sedimented all of the 
biological and cultural heritage of the human species and through which the 
human psyche is based (Giannone, 1996). 
The groupanalytic theoric model and the current psychodynamic orientation 
research, therefore, can be integrated with the most innovative achievements 
in the neuroscience of the relational experience 
In  light  of  the  above,  there  are  many  margins  of  comparability  between 
epistemology clinical-psychological and science neuro-biological, and this 
has initiated a paradigm shift that has taken the form of a device disciplinary 
hybridization  fundamental  to  the  understanding  of  connections  between 
processes relational and processes bodily. 
Seems that was done a step in the direction of integration, there is more 
optimism about the possibility of a relationship between neuro-biological 
research  and  psychotherapy.  This  is  due  to  the  fact,  already  repeatedly 
stressed  that  the  new  clinical  and  epistemological  settings  neuroscience  
seem  to  allow  theoretical  connections  and  operating  through  the 
visualization of biological systems as facts that interact with the experience. 
In  addition,  there  is  the  increasing  awareness  on  the  part  of  clinical 
psychology-dynamic, that the report is a fact that can’t be separated from 
the presence of the body, because it is here that human relationships you 
incorporate and incarnate and vice versa (Giannone, Lo Verso, 1996). 
The experience contaminates biology; the psychic subject is an inextricable 
intertwining of biology and history. As in the early stages of development, 
are  taking  shape,  precisely  because  of  the  experience  gained,  the  neural 
pathways, incomplete at birth, so nature and culture operate in a similar 
way: they are simply two different ways to make deposits synapses of the 
brain (LeDoux, 2002). A man "radically organic" is "radically cultural" at 
the same time (Gehlen, 1983). 
The goal of this work, ultimately, we hope will be to establish a connection 
between  two  different  experiences,  that  neuroscientific  and  that 
groupanalytic. The hope is that this may help to put in the right perspective, 
and systematize conceptually the complexity  , resulting in an attempt to 
hold together the steps "brain-body-mind-culture" of the  psychodynamic 
and    groupdynamic    phenomena.  Moreover,  we  repeat  again,  we  do  not 
believe that there are individual disciplines or scholars able to deal with a 
framework so wide. 
That  said,  it  is  evident  that  the  study  of  implicit  memory  represents  the 
neurobiological foundation that connects a variety of theories, attachment 
theory, the work of Daniel Stern, the motivational systems (Lichtenberg), 14  LAMPASONA R., LO VERSO G. ET AL. 
internal  working  models  (Bowlby),  the  cognitivism  evolutionary  (John 
Liotti), the control-mastery theory (Weiss and Sampson), the mind-body-
relation model. These theories, though tending to the complexity, should 
proceed in favor of an integration in order to ensure internal consistency and 
a constant dialogue. 
The goal of this work, ultimately, we hope will be to establish a connection 
between  two  different  experiences,  that  neuroscientific  and  that 
groupanalytic. The hope is that this may help to put in the right perspective, 
and systematize conceptually the complexity, resulting in an attempt to hold 
together  the  steps  "brain-body-mind-culture"  of  the  psychodynamic  and 
groupdynamic phenomena. Moreover, we repeat again, we do not believe 
that  there  are  individual  disciplines  or  scholars  able  to  deal  with  a 
framework so wide. 
That  said,  it  is  evident  that  the  study  of  implicit  memory  represents  the 
neurobiological foundation that connects a variety of theories, attachment 
theory, the work of Daniel Stern, the motivational systems (Lichtenberg), 
internal  working  models  (Bowlby),  the  cognitivism  evolutionary  (John 
Liotti), the control-mastery theory (Weiss and Sampson), the mind-body-
relation model. These theories, though tending to the complexity, should 
proceed in favor of an integration in order to ensure internal consistency and 
a constant dialogue. 
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